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ABSTRACT
The increasing adoption of renewable power generation makes
volatile quantities of electricity available, the delivery of
which cannot be guaranteed, if sold. However, if not sold,
the electricity might need to be curtailed, thus foregoing
potential profits. In this paper we adapt service level agree-
ments (SLAs) for the future smart electricity grid, where
generation will primarily depend on volatile and distributed
renewable power sources, and where buyers’ ability to cope
with uncertainty may vary significantly. We propose a con-
tracting framework through SLAs to allocate uncertain power
generation to buyers of varying preferences. These SLAs
comprise quantity, reliability and price. We define a char-
acterization of the value degradation of tolerant and critical
buyers with regards to the uncertainty of electricity deliv-
ery (generalizing the Value of Lost Load, VoLL). We con-
sider two mechanisms (sequential second-price auction and
VCG) that allocate SLAs based on buyer bids. We further
study the incentive compatibility of the proposed mecha-
nisms, and show that both mechanisms ensure that no buyer
has an incentive to misreport its valuation. We experimen-
tally compare their performance and demonstrate that VCG
dominates alternative allocations, while vastly improves the
efficiency of the proposed system when compared to a base-
line allocation considering only the VoLL. This article lays
the ground work for distributed energy trading under uncer-
tainty, thereby contributing an essential component to the
future smart grid.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest challenges that future energy systems
will face due to the increasing adoption of renewable power
generation is to maintain balance between available supply
and demand. To this end demand-side management (DSM)
is necessary. DSM is the behavior change of the demand-
side, which can be enabled through, e.g., financial incen-
tives [4]. Dynamic pricing and scheduling of consumption
loads are considered as the main methodologies for balanc-
ing demand with uncertain supply. However, the former
may introduce disruptive and unfavorable market behavior
Appears in: Proc. of the 16th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017),
S. Das, E. Durfee, K. Larson, M. Winikoff (eds.),
May 8–12, 2017, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil.
Copyright c© 2017, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
and thus planning and ahead prices are required [2], while
the latter can violate the autonomy of the consumer agents.
Other variants of DSM focus on the design of tariffs that
forward the financial risks of balancing supply and demand
to the demand-side [11, 15, 12].
Service level agreements (SLAs) can provide the contract-
ing framework for balancing volatile supply with demand be-
tween buyers and sellers of electricity. While previous work
has considered SLAs as a tool for monitoring and coordina-
tion to ensure trustworthiness between different stakehold-
ers [5], or as a negotiation protocol [1], we interpret SLAs
as a direct extension of conventional electricity tariffs.
To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first ap-
proach that adapts SLAs for energy trading under uncertain
supply. We also provide two mechanisms to allocate SLAs
to buyers of different preferences with regards to the criti-
cality of their demand. The main contributions of this work
can be summarized as follows:
• We define a contracting framework through SLAs that
enables energy trading under uncertain supply.
• We propose an exponential family of functions that
characterizes the buyers’ varying degrees of criticality,
thus generalizing the Value of Lost Load with costs
associated to the risk of failed delivery.
• We apply two mechanisms to assign SLAs to agents of
different types, and incentivize truthfulness for strate-
gic buyer agents.
• Results show that the social value vastly improves in
face of buyers with varying abilities to cope with un-
certainty.
2. CONTRIBUTION
In the proposed framework we assume that there is a single
seller (producer) with uncertain generation. Ahead of time,
the generation can be represented by the random variable
Q, while in the realization step, q ∈ R+ denotes the ob-
served supply. Figure 1 (left) illustrates the function S(q),
which denotes the reliability function of the generation. The
reliability function determines the probability that the gen-
eration exceeds a certain value of q, and therefore can satisfy
any demand up to the observed generation q.
We further consider the set B of buyers, each of which
has a demand di that needs to be satisfied. However, given
the reliability function, not all demand may be served with
probability equal to 1. Therefore, we introduce SLAs that
comprise the following features:
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Figure 1: (Left) Reliability function S(q) = P (Q > q)
of the random variable Q. The dotted area repre-
sents the portion of demand di of the buyer agent i
with reliability γi = S(w + di). The gray shaded area
represents already assigned SLAs. (Right) The ex-
pected value Vi of a buyer agent with regards to the
reliability γi of an SLA.
Quantity The quantity of electricity that is subject to be
transferred from the service provider to the user.
Reliability The probability of successful delivery of the
given quantity of electricity.
Price The price per unit of the transferred quantity.
Considering Figure 1 (left), the dotted area represents an
SLA between the seller and the buyer agents. The demand
of the buyer i is di and the reliability of the specific SLA
is γi = S(w + di), where w is the demand that is already
deducted by previously allocated SLAs.
The widest adopted concept to measure criticality in the
literature as well as in practice is the Value of Lost Load
(VoLL)[8]. The VoLL is defined as the estimated amount
that customers receiving electricity through contracts would
be willing to pay to avoid a disruption in their electricity ser-
vice. However, no previous work establishes a metric for the
valuation of electricity with regards to the uncertainty in
the delivery. Since the system gives raise to risk, we first
distinguish between different attitudes of energy buyers to-
wards the certainty of delivery, as is usual in economics and
expected utility theory [7]. More specifically, we categorize
buyer agents with respect to their attitudes towards reli-
ability as follows: critical (the expected value function is
convex, representing a risk-averse buyer), tolerant (the ex-
pected value function is concave, the buyer is risk-seeking),
and neutral (the expected value is linearly dependent to the
reliability). Figure 1 (right) illustrates the value function
Vi(γi), the value of βi distinguishes different attitudes of
buyer i towards the reliability γi. The proposed value func-
tion generalizes the concept of the VoLL with regards to the
risk of unsuccessful delivery.
The process of specifying and allocating SLAs to buy-
ers participating in the electricity market can be structured
as a mechanism [6]. We consider auctions as the mecha-
nism to allocate SLAs among buyers with varying private
preferences, since they are widely used in competitive elec-
tricity markets [3]. More specifically, we apply two auction
mechanisms to allocate supply that may become available at
the realization timestep: a sequential second-price auction
(SSPA) [10, 14], and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [13].
In SSPA, SLAs are auctioned off one at a time, while in VCG
SLAs are allocated in a socially optimal manner, thus max-
imizing the social value. Assuming unit-demand buyers, it
Figure 2: Social value with regards to the diversity
of criticality, for very low values of β-diversity all
buyers have neutral attitude towards uncertainty in
the delivery. For higher values of β-diversity buyers
have increasingly varying criticality.
can be shown that computing the optimal allocation in the
VCG mechanism can be solved optimally in polynomial time
O(n3) by the Hungarian method, given that it is equivalent
to the linear assignment problem [9]. Under some realistic,
for the setting, assumptions (e.g., no price discovery, no over-
bidding) both mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC). The dominant strategy of buyers is to
truthfully report their valuations.
Figure 2 presents the social value (average value gained
per buyer resulting from the assignement of the SLAs over
100 simulations) for varying diversity of the criticality β,
where β is sampled uniformly in the range [−D,D] (D is
the β-diversity). The random variable of the supply, Q, is
normally distributed (µQ = 20, σQ = 5), while the total de-
mand exceeds the expected supply by 20% (24 unit-demand
buyers). We illustrate the social value under four different
mechanisms: VCG, SSPA with decreasing/increasing reli-
ability SLAs (SPD/SPI), and a greedy baseline allocation
method (GB) that uses only the VoLL for the allocation
of the SLAs. The diversity in criticality β affects the so-
cial value achieved by the studied mechanisms. We observe
high system inefficiency when buyers demonstrate extreme
behavior with regards to the criticality (for large values of
β-diversity). Furthermore, SSPA with SLAs of increasing re-
liability (SPI) performs better than auctioning off SLAs of
decreasing reliability (SPD) in terms of the social value. In
all settings, the VCG mechanism yields higher social value
than all other mechanisms, setting the upper bound due to
its socially optimal allocation.
3. CONCLUSION
We proposed a contracting framework through SLAs for
electricity trading under uncertain supply and varying de-
mand criticality of the buyers. In view of the attained prop-
erties and performance, we believe that using SLAs as we
delineated here provides a promising avenue for addressing
electricity trading in future smart grids. This work lays
the ground for distributed energy trading under uncertainty,
serving as a broad basis for future extensions.
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